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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
law enforcement officials. From this
appears very sound indeed, for it
guaranteed by the Constitution and,
the protection it needs in a time of

standpoint, the Payton decision
grants individuals protections
at the same time, gives society
greatly increasing crime.
Paul E. Brown

MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT:
THE EFFECT ON RECOVERY OF AN OBLIGOR'S
BAD FAITH

After hearing a strange noise emanating from his automobile
engine, the plaintiff delivered his automobile, a Mercedes, to the defendant for repair. The defendant claimed to have corrected the
problem, but the engine produced a louder and more disturbing
sound when the plaintiff reclaimed his vehicle. Immediate attempts
by the defendant to locate the source of the new sound were unsuccessful; consequently, the plaintiff was required to leave the car for
additional repair. The defendant's failure to repair various defects
eventually resulted in the plaintiff's being stranded on three separate occasions.' The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of duty
to repair and was awarded $500 in non-itemized damages by the district court. On appeal, the defendant argued that the portion of the
award evidently representing recovery of "moral damages"' under
1. The Court stated:
The unfortunate part of these episodes is that, after each attempt at repairs,
plaintiff's car broke down on the road, leaving him stranded on one occasion on
Downman Road near the Lakefront Airport in New Orleans, once on Interstate 10
Highway in the swamp area past LaPlace and once on the Lake Pontchartrain
Causeway. On each of these occasions, plaintiff and his companions had to arrange
for an alternate method of returning home and plaintiff had to have the vehicle
towed to the defendant's for repairs.
Coddington v. Stephens Imports, Inc., 383 So. 2d 416. 417 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
2. Moral damages, commonly known as nonpecuniary damages, may be defined
as damages that repair prejudice to one's emotional equanimity. Since the $500 award
by the district court was not itemized, proving that the award included any moral
damages is difficult, although this fact was implied by the district court judge. Reasons
for Judgment, Coddington v. Stephens Imports, Inc., No. 77-14342 (Dist. Ct. Orl. La.
1979). Moreover, on appeal both the plaintiff and the defendant assumed that moral
damages had been awarded. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Stephens Imports, Inc. at 6,
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Coddington at 6, Coddington v. Stephens Imports, Inc., 383
So. 2d 416 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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Louisiana Civil Code article 1934(3) was proscribed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court's ruling on the award of such damages in Meador v.
Toyota of Jefferson, Inc..' The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found
Meador not to be controlling, the basis of its finding being the
greater inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff in the instant case as
compared to the inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff in Meador.
Comparing the facts of the instant case to those in Meador, the
court remarked, "[The inconvenience suffered by a] motorist who
was stranded on the highways on three occasions ... can hardly be
likened to the inconvenience an owner may suffer while his car sits
in the repair shop unduly."' Coddington v. Stephens Imports, Inc.,
383 So. 2d 416 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
Article 1934 of the Louisiana Civil Code governs the awarding of
damages for breach of contract. It provides the general rule that the
measure of damages in a contract for anything other than payment
of money is the amount of loss sustained by the creditor and the
profit of which he has been deprived, subject to certain modifications.' Article 1934(1) provides that in cases of ordinary breach,
damages are limited to those that were foreseen or can be supposed
to have been foreseen by the parties at the time of contracting. Article 1934(2), however, provides that when inexecution of the contract has been through fraud or bad faith, the debtor is liable for all
the immediate and direct prejudice that the creditor has suffered,
whether foreseen or not.' Finally, article 1934(3) specifies limited cir3. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
4. 383 So. 2d at 418.
6. The introductory paragraph of Civil Code article 1934 provides in part:
Where the object of the contract is any thing but the payment of money, the
damages due to the creditor for its breach are the amount of the loss he has sustained, and the profit of which he has been deprived, under the following exceptions and modifications.
6. Civil Code article 1934(1) provides:
When the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is liable only for
such damages as were contemplated, or may reasonably be supposed to have
entered into the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract. By bad
faith in this and the next rule, is not meant the mere breach of faith in not complying with the contract, but a designed breach of it from some motive of interest
or ill will.
7. Civil Code article 1934(2) provides:
When the inexeeution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or bad faith,
the debtor shall not only be liable to such damages as were, or might have been
foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also to such as are the immediate
and direct consequence of the breach of that contract; but even when there is
fraud, the damages can not exceed this.
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cumstances in which contractual prejudice, though not experienced
in terms of pecuniary loss, may be repaired.' The damages that
repair such prejudice are most accurately referred to as moral
damages.' Article 1934(3) states in part:
Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some
intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality, or taste, or
some convenience or other legal gratification, although these are
not appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due
for their breach.
The article then lists promises of marriages, contracts for artistic
work, and contracts for religious or charitable foundations as examples of contracts whose breach gives rise to moral damages."
In contractual actions, the awarding of moral damages by the
Louisiana courts has for the most part been a matter of interpreting
article 1934(3). Undoubtedly, the most important case in this area is
Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc." Prior to Meador, Louisiana
courts disagreed over the extent to which a contract was required
to have been made for "intellectual enjoyment," as stipulated by article 1934(3), in order to allow the award of moral damages for its
breach." In resolving this controversy, the supreme court said "[W]e
8.

Civil Code article 1934(3) provides in part:
Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of the loss the
creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he has been deprived, yet there are
cases in which damages may be assessed without calculating altogether on the
pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain to the party.
9. Such damages are not exactly nonpecuniary or nonpatrimonial since they are
repaired in money. Moreover, terms such as "mental anguish" merely describe certain
ways in which such damages arise. "Moral damages" suggest damages that are paid in
compensation for something other than patrimonial prejudice. The term is a translation of the French equivalent, dommage moral. Litvinoff, Moral Damages. 38 LA. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1977). The term "damages" refers to money that is paid in order to repair
the injury attending a contractual breach. The term "damage" refers to the injury
itself. In order to avoid confusion, the word "prejudice" will be used in place of
"damage".
10. Civil Code article 193(3) provides in part:
[A] contract for a religious or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or
an engagement for a work of some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of
this rule.
11. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
12. Id. at 435. The disagreement was caused by the indefinite language of Civil
Code article 19343). The court in Meador characterized prior jurisprudence interpreting Civil Code article 1934(3) as being "liberal," see Jack v. Henry, 128 So. 2d 62
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) (moral damages were allowed for breach of a contract to build
a home on the grounds that a home was "some convenience" as provided in Civil Code
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clearly do not hold that the object of a contract must be exclusively
intellectual enjoyment in order to trigger article 1934(3)'s non
pecuniary damages. We do hold, however, that such intellectual enjoyment must be a principal object of the contract."18
Since Meador, the courts have been reluctant to award moral
damages for contractual breach, a reluctance which is undoubtedly
due to both the relatively obscure language of article 1934(3)" and a
tradition against awarding such damages in the civil law."5 When
moral damages have been granted, the plaintiff either has clearly
proven a principal purpose of intellectual enjoyment,"6 or he has
recovered under another theory."1
Inevitably, the indefinite language of article 1934(3) has resulted
in conflicting applications of the article to specific contractual situations by different appellate courts." In Ostrowe v. Darensbourg,"
article 1934(3)); "broad," see Melson v. Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945)
(when the defendant wrongfully sold a home that the plaintiffs intended to buy, moral
damages were granted because a home exists for the "gratification of some intellectual
enjoyment" as provided in Civil Code article 1934(3)): and "strict," see Lillis v. Ander.
son, 21 So. 2d 389 (La. App. Orl. 1945) (breach of a contract to renovate a bathroom
could not give rise to moral damages because the contract was not for some "intellectual enjoyment").
13. 332 So. 2d at 437-38 (emphasis added). The court used the word "object" not in
its civilian contractual sense, but to signify an end or purpose. This usage of the word
is thus nearly identical to the concept of cause in contractual obligations.
14. For example, in Meador the specific controversy concerned the phrase "or
some convenience" in Civil Code article 1934(3). The plaintiff argued that this phrase
allowed recovery of moral damages regardless of whether the contract was made for
intellectual enjoyment, a contention that the court rejected. Id. at 435. See note 12.
supra.
15. With regard to this tradition in the common law, see A. CORBIN, 5 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1076 (1964).

16. E.g., Smith v. Andrepont, 378 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (moral
damages were granted for redhibition of a "show" horse).
17. E.g., Alexander v. Qwik Change Car Center, Inc., 352 So. 2d 188 (La. 1977)
(moral damages were requested for contractual breach and allowed because of the tortious conversion of the plaintiffs car to the defendant's use); Lacey v. Baywood Truck
& Mach., 381 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (damages for inconvenience were allowed
in a redhibition suit on the theory that a reduced price should reflect what the buyer
would have paid if he had known of the vehicle's defects).
18. The prime example is the differing treatment of redhibitory actions involving
automobiles by the courts. Compare Willis v. Ford Motor Co., 383 So. 2d 136 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980) (inconvenience damages were allowed and Civil Code article 1934(3) was
not mentioned) with Wheat v. Boutte Auto Sales, 355 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978) (moral damages were denied under Meador).
19. 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42

the supreme court resolved one such conflict 0 by denying moral
damages for breach of contract to build a distinctively designed
home. Moreover, the court strongly implied that intellectual enjoyment must be the principal purpose of a contract, as opposed to a
principal purpose, in order to permit the award of moral damages.2
Thus, the criterion for recovery of moral damages under article
1934(3) appears to have been further restricted.
Despite the uncertain meaning of article 1934(3), the fourth circuit's allowance of moral damages in the instant case is difficult to
explain in light of the denial of such damages by the supreme court
in Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc." . and the factual similarity of
the two cases. In Meador suit arose when the defendant took an excessive amount of time to repair the plaintiff's Toyota automobile
after it had been involved in an accident. The supreme court denied
moral damages on the grounds that intellectual enjoyment had been
only an incidental purpose of the contract for repair. However, the
contractual purposes in Meador and Coddington were identical; each
plaintiff wanted his car repaired. Thus, the same result logically
should have followed in both cases in the absence of distinguishing
facts relevant to the requirements of article 1934(3).23 The fourth circuit, however, distinguished Coddington from Meador in terms of
the differing degrees of inconvenience suffered by the plaintiffs, a
distinction that is wholly irrelevant to any finding of "intellectual
enjoyment." Coddington on its face is therefore anomalous.
One way to explain the instant case is to distinguish it from
Meador on the basis of the automobile involved. One might argue
20. Compare Whitener v. Clark, 356 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978) ($5000
moral damages were allowed for breach of a contract to build a home) with Catalanotto
v. Hebert, '347 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (moral damages were denied for
delay in a contract to build a home) and Ostrowe v. Darensbourg, 369 So. 2d 1156 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1979) (moral damages were denied for breach of a contract to build a
distinctively designed home).
21. In referring to the contract in Ostrowe, the court said, "[Clarrying the reasoning still further, if such a contract has as a purpose intellectual gratification 'is that
gratification the principal object of the contract? We think not." 377 So. 2d at 1203
.(emphasis added). But see the dissenting opinion by Justice Calogero. 377 So. 2d at
1203 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
22. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
23. This reasoning is supported by those cases which have denied moral damages
in redhibitory actions involving automobiles, E.g., Muller v. A.K. Durnin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 361 So. 2d 1257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Bendana v. Mossy Motors, Inc.,
347 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). See authorities cited in note 18, supra. The
same reasoning is also shown by Judge Redmann in his dissenting opinion to the instant case where he says simply, "Non-pecuniary damages are not recoverable; Meador
v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc. .... " 383 So. 2d at 418 (Redmann, J., dissenting in part).

19811

NOTES

that the principal purpose of owning a Mercedes, hence the principal
purpose of having it repaired, is the intellectual enjoyment to be
derived thereby. Conversely, the principal purpose of owning a
Toyota, as stated in Meador, is its physical utility. Since Mercedes
automobiles are well known for their technological perfection, a contract for repair of a Mercedes fits easily within the illustrative
language of article 1934(3). For example, the contract in the instant
case can be regarded as having been made for the gratification of
"taste." Eminent authority supports the view that contracts concerning fine automobiles may be made for a principal purpose of "intellectual enjoyment."2 However, the supreme court's opinion in
Ostrowe v. Darensbourg5 casts some doubt upon the validity of
such a position. One is hard pressed to say that the principal purpose of owning a Mercedes is intellectual enjoyment and not merely
the physical utility of transportation.
The result in Coddington can better be justified as a recovery of
moral damages under article 1934(2) rather than under article
1934(3)." Article 1934(2) specifies that when breach of contract has
occurred through fraud or bad faith, the debtor is liable for all "immediate and direct" damages." Thus; the plain import of the
language allows recovery of moral damages in the instant case since
the inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff was clearly an immediate
and direct" consequence of the defendant's failure to repair. This
statutory basis for awarding moral damages is not unknown in Loui24. Litvinoff, supra note 9, at 17.
25. 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979).
26. An undiscussed alternative is to view the defendant's breach of contract in the
instant case as a delictual matter since to do so would make moral damages freely
awardable. This alternative interpretation would represent an extension of present
law, because recovery in tort generally is conditioned upon the existence of property

damage or personal injury to the plaintiff. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So.
2d 433, 438 (La. 1976) (Dixon, J., dissenting). However, for a common law case that
takes this alternative approach in a situation similar to the instant case, see
Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977). The continental writers discuss the merging of delictual and contractual responsibility under
the concept of cumul. See generally. J. VAN RYN, RESPONSABILITt: AQUILIENNE ET CON.
TRATS (1933).

27.
28.

See the text of Civil Code article 1934(2), cited in note 7, supra.
Whether prejudice is direct seems to depend upon the links of causation be-

tween the prejudice and the contractual breach. The classic example is given by

Pothier. A merchant sells a sick cow to a farmer; the sickness is contagious and causes
the farmer's herd to die. The loss of the herd prevents the farmer from cultivating his
land. The loss of the herd is direct; the inability to cultivate the land is not. See 2 M.
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE Pt. 1, no. 249 at 150 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans.

1959).
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siana jurisprudence" and has some doctrinal support.8 Moreover,
this explanation does not offend the two rulings by the supreme
court on moral damages since they dealt exclusively with article
1934(3). Finally, such an interpretation suggests what was perhaps
an unconscious foundation for the seemingly irrelevant grounds
upon which the fourth circuit distinguished Coddington from
Meador. When a contract is breached through fraud or bad faith, as
will be shown was the case in Coddington, any resulting moral
damage tends to be more severe than in instances of ordinary inexecution as in Meador.8 1
The use of article 1934(2) as statutory authority for the award of
moral damages in the instant case is necessarily predicated on a finding of fraud or bad faith breach. Article 1934(1) defines bad faith as
a "designed breach ... from some motive of interest or ill will. '"' At
first blush article 1934(li would seem to require a conscious intention to breach on the part of the defendant. However, it is arguably
within the permissible bounds of judicial interpretation to consider
the defendant's repeated failure to repair as acts sufficient to warrant a presumption that the breach was "designed" within the meaning of article 1934(U).11 Similar judicial definitions of article 1934(1)
bad faith are to be found in Louisiana jurisprudence.' Moreover,
29. See Modisette v. American Integrity Ins. Co., 297 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1974) (the bad faith breach of an insurance contract by a company gave rise to moral
damages under Civil Code article 1934(2)); Smallpage v. Wagner & Wagner, 84 So. 2d
863 (La. App. Orl. 1956) (the possibility of moral damages under Civil Code article
1934(2) was implied but damages were denied for lack of proof thereof); Morse v.
Oates, 11 La. App. 462. 123 So. 439 (2d Cir. 1929) (the possibility of moral damages
under Civil Code article 1934(2) was discussed but damages sought were denied
because they were indirect).
30. Litvinoff, supra note 9, at 22.
31, This assertion must be true as a matter of probability. If an obligor negligently
fails to perform his obligation or actively intends nonperformance, prejudice in general
will tend to be more severe because the obligor is not looking after the obligee's contractual interests, or he is desiring actual harm of some sort to befall the obligee. If an
obligor is in good faith, he will try to minimize prejudice to the obligee that stems
from his nonperformance.
32. See the text of Civil Code article 1934(1), cited in note 6, supra.
33. This proposition is supported by Civil Code article 1848, which provides that
contractual fraud may be a matter of legal presumption. However, application of the
article and Civil Code article 1847, defining contractual fraud, to Civil Code articles
1934(1) and 1934(2) is questionable, for these articles concern fraud in the formation of
contracts.
34. E.g., Friendly Fin., Inc. v. Cefalu Realty Inv., Inc., 303 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1974) (the defendant-lessor's lease of a parking lot to a third party in violation of
the plaintiff-lessee's lease was in "legal bad faith" despite the defendant's protestations
of honest error). Arguably, as a matter of proof the defendant's breach in the instant
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among French writers and in French jurisprudence, contractual
breaches characterized by gross negligence are generally treated as
being made in bad faith." This view is persuasive since sections (1)
and (2) of article 1934 are taken directly from the French Civil
Code.-"
The strongest objection to allowing recovery of moral damages
under article 1934(2) is that the positive provisions of article 1934(3)
imply exclusivity by their existence. Since the code explicitly mentions one situation, it is difficult to argue that the redactors of the.
Louisiana Civil Code contemplated two situations in which moral
damages might be awarded for contractual breach. Regardless of the
original intentions of the redactors, however, the history of moral
damages in the Civil Law provides ample reason for interpreting article 1934(2) to allow such damages.
The limited availability of moral damages for breach of contracts
case was in fact consciously "designed." See Modisette v. American Integrity Ins. Co.,
297 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974) ("sufficient evidence of motive, opportunity and
irregular procedure" justified a finding of bad faith) (Ud.at 500).
35. The equivalent concept in France is the incorporation of faute lourde into dol.
In a contractual context faute lourde is defined as a breach "that reveals an unskillfulness or negligence pushed to an astonishing degree." 4 J. CARBONNIER. DROrr
CIVIL-LES OBLIGATIONS n0 72 (7th ed. 1972) (Writer's trans.). Dol exists when "it Is intentionally that the debtor does not execute his obligation." 1 H. MAZEAUD, L.
MAZEAUD ET A. TUNC. TRAITCg THftORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT, CIVILE
DtLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE nc 674 (6th ed. 1965) (Writer's trans.). "It is necessary

at least to presume in the absence of proof to the contrary that faute lourde is
'dolosive." Id. at n0 675-2 (Writer's trans.). Faute lourde "is, in general, regarded as
equivalent in effect to dot ....

0
" J. CAR ONNIER, supra, at n 72 (Writer's trans.). Most

often the French courts "apply the adage, faute Jourde is equivalent to dot." H.

0
MAZEAUD, supra, at n 675-2 (Writer's trans.). See A. JOUANNEAU, RECUEIL DE MAXIMES
ET CITATIONS LATINES A L'USAGE DY MONDE JUDICIARE nos. 684-5 (2d ed. 1924).
36. Article 1149 of the CODE NAPOLEON provides:

The damages and interest due to a creditor are. in general, to the amount of
the loss which he has sustained or of the gain of which he has been deprived; saving the exceptions and modifications following.
CODE NAPOLEON art. 1149 (anonymous trans. 1824).
Article 1150 of the CODE NAPOLEON provides:

The debtor is only bound for the damages and interest which were foreseen or
which might have been foreseen at the time of the contract, when it is not in consequence of his fraud that the obligation has not been executed.
CODE NAPOLEON art. 1150 (anonymous trans. 1824).
Article 1151 of the CODE NAPOLEON provides:

Even in the case where the non-performance of the contract results from the
fraud of the debtor, the damages and interest must not comprehend, as regards
the loss sustained by the creditor and the gain of which he has been deprived,
any thing which is not the immediate and direct consequence of the nonperformance of the contract.
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in Louisiana is founded on the civilian tradition of awarding moral
damages freely in delictual matters and precluding them absolutely
in contractual ones."7 This distinction between contractual and delictual liability rose to prominence in French legal thought through the
influence of Pothier and Domat. These writers created the distinction in civilian doctrine because they incorrectly believed it to be a
fundamental principle of Roman law. In fact, the Romans made no
distinction whatsoever with regard to moral damages between contractual and delictual liability." In France today this historical
mistake is well recognized but is not important because, as a practical matter, French jurisprudence has long since conceded the
general availability of moral damages in contractual actions." In
CODE NAPOLEON art. 1151 (anonymous trans. 1824).
Compare CODE NAPOLEON arts. 1149-1151, 8upra, with LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934, the
text of which is cited in notes 5-7, supra. Precisely, the pertinent parts of Civil Code
article 1934 and the Code Napoleon articles share the same sources; the first three
provisions of Civil Code article 1934 may be traced to passages in Toullier, Pothier,
and Domat. See Batiza, The Actual Sources of the LouisianaProjet of 1823: A General
Analytical Survey. 47 TUL. L. REv. 1, 79 (1972).
37. See note 36, supra. Since sections (1) and (2) of Civil Code article 1934 have
their origins in the French Code Civil, their interpretation naturally has reflected the
interpretation given the French articles.
38. Professor Mazeaud is explicit on this point:
Our ancient law recorded the Roman tradition, but it only recorded it in an imperfect manner, because the authors had only an imperfect knowledge of the
texts. This gap led them to establish a distinction that roman law had never made
between delictual liability and contractual liability ....

In the contractual domain,

our ancient authors refuse categorically to admit the reparation of moral prejudice: inexecution of a contract only gave rise to damage interests to the profit
of the creditor on the condition that he could establish that he suffered pecuniary
prejudice. Domat and Pothier are explicit on this point; they rely, in ignorance, on
the roman law.
H. MAZEAUD, supra note 35, at n0 299 (Writer's trans.).
If, behind the terms employed [in the French articles on contractual damages],
one studies the spirit that guided the redactors, it must be acknowledged, it is
true, that they were hostile to the reparation of moral damage in contractual matters. Is this a reason to refuse today to make the best of the fact that they did
not expressly indicate their thoughts? No, because it is necessary to see the
reason for their hostility.
It is due to the fact that Domat and Pothier, whom they followed faithfully
here, refused categorically to repair moral damage in contractual matters.
Id. at nO 331 (Writer's trans.).
39. Professor Mazeaud cites several decisions in which the French courts awarded
moral damages for breach of contract:
As for the courts, they have had little hesitation. If one can find some old decisions deciding to the contrary, the jurisprudence today unanimously admits the
reparation of moral damage.
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Louisiana the situation is different. In effect, the now discredited
civilian tradition against awarding moral damages for breach of contract lives on in the interpretations currently given to articles
1934(1) and (2). The nearly uniform acceptance of this tradition by
the Louisiana courts undoubtedly has been aided by the fact that article 1934(3), which has no equivalent in the French Civil Code,'"
mitigates the glaring failure of the tradition to protect the moral interests of contracting parties." The mere existence of article 1934(3),
however, taken in the context of early nineteenth century civilian
thought, indicates the redactors' approval of moral damages in contractual actions and their willingness to depart from doctrine, then
regarded as sacrosanct. Since this doctrine is now discredited
throughout the civilian world, nothing should prevent expanded recovery of moral damages under the language of article 1934(2)."2
The fact that there is no valid doctrinal bar to recovery of moral
damages in contractual actions suggests that they could be awarded
under article 1934(1) as well as under 1934(2); no language in either
article restricts the scope of statutory coverage to pecuniary
damages." This extension would allow the awarding of all contractual damages under the same conceptual framework. However, as
will be seen, the only situations in which moral damages could be
awarded under article 1934(1) are already contemplated, at least in a
conceptual sense, by article 1934(3). As a practical matter, a unified
basis for awarding all contractual damages is realized simply by interpreting article 1934(2) in the manner previously suggested.
Moral prejudice can be conceptualized accurately in terms of the
One can cite a certain number of particular decisions, sufficiently old. Indemnities were allowed: . .. in the case where inexecution of a contract by one of the
parties did injury to the religious sentiments of the other party .... in the case

where the improper breach of a contract for labor by a workman caused the
employer to suffer moral damage to his authority as an employer ....
Id. at n0 334 (Writer's trans.).
40. 332 So. 2d at 436. The provision appears to have been inspired by a passage in
Toullier. See Litvinoff. supra note 9, at 8.
41. One might speculate that the existence of Civil Code article 1934(3) has
prevented the reappraisal of this tradition that has occurred in other civilian jurisdictions. See Litvinoff, supra note 9, at 28.
42. See note 38, supra. Mazeaud uses similar reasoning. His argument is stronger
in Louisiana because the redactors of the Civil Code expressed some approval of moral
damages in contractual matters, approval that was significant in the doctrinal milieu of
the early nineteenth century.
43. Pecuniary damages are mentioned specifically in Civil Code article 1934(3) only
in the definition of moral damages. See text of Civil Code articles cited in notes 6-8,
supra.
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loss suffered by an obligee and the profit of which he has been
deprived, as provided for in the introductory paragraph of article
1934. Under this view the nonrealization of the positive emotional
state that would accompany a contractual performance constitutes a
"deprivation of moral profit." The obligee experiences this deprivation of moral profit in the form of disappointment, a negative emotional state. A negative emotional state which results from a contractual breach but which is not linked to any deprivation of moral
profit constitutes a "moral loss."" The critical distinction between
loss and deprivation of profit generally is that in the latter case one
is denied something that one prospectively desires, whereas in the
former case one experiences prejudice to the status quo, whether it
be patrimonial or emotional. Deprivation of moral profit and moral
loss comprise prejudice to the obligee's moral interest."' This interest may be defined as the obligee's continuing desire to maximize
his emotional level of existence. In the case of moral profit, the
44. Contra, Litvinoff, supra note 9, at 9-10. The Roman concepts of damnum
emergen8 and lucrum cessan8 mentioned by Professor Litvinoff are equivalent to loss
and deprivation of profit. 2 S. LITVINOFF. OBLIGATIONS 338-9 (1969). However, Professor
Litvinoff incorrectly identifies "moral loss" as merely the loss of spiritual gratification
that occurs in situations exemplified under article 1934(3) and "deprivation of moral
profit" as the frustration of expectation in the same situations.
The only difference between these two concepts, as Professor Litvinoff defines
them, is that deprivation of moral profit has an experiential dimension that is not
shared by moral loss. Actually, the two concepts are more properly thought of as comprising the experiential and abstract components, respectively, of what is in fact
deprivation of moral profit alone. The confusion arises from the fact that deprivation of
moral profit seems like a loss. It is a loss, as deprivation of pecuniary profit is also a
loss, but only in the sense that all damage is a loss because it is subjectively unpleasant. However, the characterization of damage in terms of deprivation of profit and
loss within Civil Code article 1934 ultimately concerns differences in the way that
damage arises as a matter of abstraction, not of experience. Deprivation of profit contemplates the nonrealization of something that one has desired to receive. The idea of
loss, in the sense that it is used in the introductory paragraph to article 1934. contemplates the realization of something that an obligee has desired not to receive. In
the case of pecuniary damage. the essentially abstract nature of the two categories is
obscured by the fact that there is a 'valid experiential distinction between them as
well. An obligee generally does not have a problem distinguishing between money he
has lost and money that he has been prevented from making. The distinction is made
easily because pecuniary damage, though sometimes speculative, has an objective existence. Moral damage, on the other hand, can only be conceptualized subjectively; it
has no real meaning outside of the context of internal experience. Since all damage is
in some sense a loss, both deprivation of moral profit and moral loss are experienced
as negative emotions. The ways in which the two species of moral prejudice arise are
nevertheless conceptually distinct; the distinction between moral profit and loss accords
with the distinction between the two kinds of pecuniary prejudice.
45. Litvinoff, supra note 9, at 10.
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obligee's moral interest consists of an active desire for emotional
satisfaction; in the case of moral loss, the moral interest consists of
a passive desire to avoid emotional dissatisfaction. Analogous interests are possessed by an obligee in the context of pecuniary prejudice. Moreover, as is the case with pecuniary prejudice, nothing
prevents the two kinds of moral prejudice from arising from the
same contractual breach.
Reparation of both kinds of moral prejudice under the general
contractual provisions of article 1934 is subject at the outset to two
limitations that are implied by the nature of contract. The first one
is that in order to be repaired, moral prejudice should be substantial.0 This condition does not come from article 1934, but is more in
the nature of a 8ui generis policy consideration." Contracting parties, by the fact that they try to regulate the future in an uncertain
world, must be deemed to accept the risk of experiencing a certain
amount of vexation from contractual breach." The second limitation
is that moral prejudice should not be repaired if it is directly tied to
the existence of pecuniary prejudice. Since pecuniary prejudice due
to contractual breach generally is repaired, reparation of moral prejudice that is dependent strictly on the existence of pecuniary prejudice effectively would create a double recovery."
Currently, all deprivation of moral profit that might be repaired
under article 1934(1) is adequately repaired, at least in a conceptual
sense,5 under article 1934(3). A contract in which. the obligee's cause
46. The problem of deciding what constitutes "substantial" moral damage remains. The inquiry is similar to but not fraught with the same difficulties as trying to
decide what is meant by the phrase "principally for intellectual enjoyment" under Civil
Code article 1934(3).
47. See Elston v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 381 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1980); Litvinoff, supra note 9, at 15.
48. Courts do not always follow this rule, as evidenced by the cases in which
nominal damages are awarded for breach of contract.
49. This consideration takes care of a problem posed by moral prejudice as defined
in the text at note 44, supra. To some extent every contractual breach involving
pecuniary loss or deprivation of pecuniary gain will involve a corresponding degree of
moral prejudice. In some cases the resulting negative emotional state will undoubtedly
satisfy the requirement of substantiality. From a commercial standpoint, if nothing
else, the reparation of all moral prejudice tied to pecuniary prejudice probably would have
negative economic consequences. Reparation in these circumstances is unnecessary.
however, because reparation of pecuniary prejudice generally will restore the oblige.'.
emotional equanimity.
50. The type of contract contemplated by Civil Code article 19S4(8) is clearly one
that involves a deprivation of moral profit. However, the article by Its language and
the holdings in Meador and Ostrowe restricts recovery of moral damages to situations
in which the obligee's contractual purpose is sufficiently related to the reallaation of
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for contracting is the moral profit he will derive through performance constitutes the only situation in which a contractual breach
can cause a deprivation of moral profit that fulfills the express and
implicit requirement of article 1934(1) that prejudice be foreseeable
and direct. 1 Such a contract is conceptually identical to one that is
made for "intellectual enjoyment" under article 1934(3). When
breach of this type of contract occurs, the negative emotions that
the obligee experiences will be due primarily to disappointment at
not realizing moral profit. Any moral loss will be in the form of
negative emotions that arise from consequences of the breach other
than nonrealization of moral profit." In all cases under article
moral profit (i.e., where the contract is one made principally for intellectual
enjoyment).
51. Conceivably, deprivation of moral profit could result from breach of a contract
that had not been made by the obligee for the purpose of satisfying his moral interest.
As implied in the text at this note, however, such deprivation of moral profit would be
neither foreseeable nor direct and thus would not be reparable.
52. An example is helpful to illustrate the manner in which moral prejudice arises
and the practical problems involved in its reparation. Suppose that H is both an
audiophile and a disc jockey who hires himself out to play records at parties. H contracts to have B build a sophisticated and powerful stereo system.
If B performs on time, H will realize a number of advantages. First, H will be able
to make a large net profit since, in anticipation of the marvelous sound that the new
system will produce, a number of party-givers already have contracted for H's services. A large net profit will result in a high level of emotional satisfaction for H, particularly since he has spent all his savings on the system. Moreover, H will realize additional emotional satisfaction because the system will enable him to listen to a recorded
rock concert without any distortion.
Suppose that B in good faith is unable to perform. H has lost the money he paid for
the system and the profit he would have made had B performed. H suffers emotional
distress because he has no livelihood and no savings. Moreover, he is distressed by the
fact that he cannot experience the listening pleasure that he was anticipating. Finally,
to make matters worse, H's girlfriend will not date him anymore since H has no
money; H is heartbroken.
Clearly, H has suffered pecuniary loss and deprivation of pecuniary profit in the
money he has paid and the profits he has been prevented from making. This prejudice
will be repaired according to its directness and foreseeability under article 1934(l). The
moral prejudice that attends H's pecuniary prejudice is made up of both deprivation of
moral profit and moral loss as they have been defined in the text at note 44, supra.
This moral prejudice should not be repaired since its existence is strictly dependent on
the existence of pecuniary damage. See note 49 and accompanying text, supra. The
loss of the intellectual or emotional satisfaction that H would have gained by being
able to listen to an undistorted recorded rock concert is experienced by H as disappointment. This loss of satisfaction constitutes a deprivation of moral profit. H's heartbreak, on the other hand, is a moral loss since it is a negative emotional state that
arises from something other than the nonrealization of moral profit. Assuming that H's
contract was made principally for intellectual enjoyment, H can recover for deprivation
of moral profit under article 1934(3). Applying the criteria of article 1934(1), the
deprivation of moral profit suffered by H is direct and, if B were aware of H's moral
interest, foreseeable. The same cannot be said of H's moral loss. The loss probably
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1934(3), deprivation of moral profit will be direct, since it is
necessarily an immediate consequence of the breach of this kind of
contract." Moral loss in these circumstances will be direct if it is
causally connected with the breach to a sufficient degree." In most
cases both kinds of moral prejudice will be foreseen since the
obligee's desire for emotional satisfaction is his cause for having
made the contract, and therefore his general moral interests presumably have entered the contractual field.' However, if moral prejudice is unforeseeable by the obligor, under article 1934(1) reparation should not take place. In at least one instance a Louisiana court
has already applied this requirement of foreseeability to a suit for
moral damages under article 19 34(3 ).
Although moral loss can arise from the same contractual breach
that causes a deprivation of moral profit, moral loss also may result
from non-performance of a contract whose performance would not
cause the obligee to realize any moral profit. If such moral loss
meets the requirements to article 1934(1), it should be repaired.
When the obligor breaches in good faith, however, recovery may be
denied because moral loss, though possibly direct and substantial,
will have been unforeseen by the parties." Contracts, being largely
a means of regulating patrimonial affairs, do not create an awareness in contracting parties of the moral prejudice that can result
from a breach. Unless a contract arguably is covered under article
1934(3) or its breach is handled as a delictual matter,. contracting
could not be described as direct. See note 28, supra. Moreover, although B may be
aware of H's active desire for emotional gratification and thus aware of H's moral interests in general, H's heartbreak is nevertheless unforeseeable and therefore not
reparable. See note 55, infra. In any case, such questions primarily have abstract
significance since reparation of any moral prejudice involves imprecise pecuniary
valuation of subjective considerations.
53. Article 1934(3) contracts are by definition made for purposes of realizing moral
profit.
54. See note 28, 8upra.
55. Moral loss, as it has been defined, see text at note 44, supra, is not an implied
consequence of the breach exemplified in article 1934(3) as is the case with deprivatien
of moral profit. However, if an obligor is aware of an obligee's interest in obtaining
emotional satisfaction through contractual performance, he is presumably made aware
of the obligee's moral interests in general (i.e., the obligee's additional desire to avoid
moral loss). As a general matter, contracting parties cannot be presumed to foresee
the possibility of moral damage.
56. See Bowes v. Fox-Stanley Photo Prods., Inc., 379 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1980).
57. See note 55, supra.
58. An example would be contracts in which the physical well-being of the obligee
is at stake, such as contracts for medical treatment. In these situations the moral interest of the obligee is self preservation, and the obligor is naturally aware of this fact.
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parties' minds tend to be focused on the potential for pecuniary prejudice. Even in the troublesome situation of car repair this tendency
would seem to be true. Although one can say that moral loss in the
form of great inconvenience is the inevitable result of a car becoming inoperative, the likelihood of a car becoming inoperative after it
has been restored to running condition by a repairman working in
good faith seems remote. Such a situation would appear to be the
only one in which a repairman working in good faith could cause
substantial moral prejudice. Such prejudice would not be contemplated by the parties because of the improbable manner in which
it would have to occur. Therefore, except in the case of contracts
under article 1934(3), all good faith occurrences of moral loss will be
unforeseeable and not reparable under article 1934(1)."'
Under article 1934(2) moral prejudice of both kinds would be
repaired as long as the prejudice is direct and regardless of its foreseeability. As the foregoing analysis indicates, this interpretation of
article 1934(2), in combination with the recovery allowed under article 1934(3), effectively awards moral damages according to the
general framework for awarding pecuniary damages. The suggested
interpretation accomplishes this result because moral prejudice will
only be foreseen, as required by article 1934(1), in the situations contemplated by article 1934(3). The suggested interpretation of article
1934(2) has the additional advantage of contemplating many of the
contractual situations in which moral damages are presently
precluded, but in which equity demands that such damages be
awarded."
The conceptual situations that give rise to reparation of moral
damages under articles 1934(2) and (3) are more fully contemplated
by the Louisiana State Law Institute's proposed article on moral
However, in general whether a contractual breach is handled as a delictual matter
seems to depend upon the existence of personal injury or property damage. Concerning automobile repair in this respect, see Patton v. Precision Motors, Inc., 352 So. 2d
341 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (destruction of a sports car transmission during repair
gave rise to moral damages under an implied recovery in tort); Hunt v. Ford Motor
Co., 341 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977) (personal injury resulting from an accident
caused by the failure to repair a car gave rise to recovery of moral damages in tort).
59. Foreseeability generally is considered to be a matter for case by case determination. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 28, at no. 250 at 151. But, with respect to moral
damages, this rule should be different for the empirical reasons suggested.
60. Most of the egregious cases of moral prejudice that result from breach of contract involve repeated failure to perform as in the instant case. Breach of contract in
these instances will almost have to be in bad faith and at least should be considered as
such. See text at notes 35 & 36, supra.
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damages which provides that, "Moral damages [Damages for nonpecuniary loss] may be recovered according to the nature of the contract, or according to the circumstances surrounding an obligor's
failure to perform. Such damages may not be recovered for mere
worry or vexation."" The comments to the article indicate that the
first two provisions are intended to allow moral damages in situations similar to those under article 1934(3) and article 1934(2) as interpreted. The third provision makes express the requirement that
moral prejudice be substantial. in order to be repaired." Enactment
of the proposed article would make possible the development of comprehensive jurisprudence concerning moral damages in contractual
actions. Such development would occur free of the historically
limited application of article 1934(2) and the convoluted interpretations of article 1934(3)." The breadth of the language of the proposed
article implies an intention to make moral damages more freely
.available and to allow judicial discretion in interpreting the
articles." It is hoped that the legislature will approve this measure
when it is presented for their consideration. Should the proposed article be rejected, however, the courts may properly interpret Civil
Code article 1934(2) in the manner suggested.
William Barret Conway, Jr.
61. LA. ST. L. INST., REVISION OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870 BOOK IIIOBLIGATIONS, art. 5 (S. Litvinoff, rep.).
62. Id., Official Revision Comments (b), (c) and (d).
63. The comments specifically indicate that the proposed article is intended to
avoid the limitations on recovery of moral damages posed by the literal restrictiveness
of Civil Code article 1934(2) and the phrase "intellectual enjoyment" in article 1934(3).
LA. ST. L. INST., REVISION OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870 BOOK III-OBLIGATIONS, art. 5 (S. Litvinoff, rep.), Comments (a) and (c).

64. This discretion should be agreeable to the Louisiana judiciary. In Meador
Justice Calogero, speaking for the majority, said, "Perhaps it would be better if
damages for mental anguish in breach of contract cases were allowable just as in tort
actions. However, such a matter directs itself to the lawmaker. Our responsibility is to
interpret and apply the law, not to enact it." 332 So. 2d at 438.

